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Even if political and nationalistic obstacles to disarmament were 
overcome, proposals to disarm might be challenged on purely eco-
nomic grounds. A significant number of countries might experience 
declines in growth if military budgets were cut. Disarmament might 
also be hindered if leaders choose only to recognize the positive effects 
of defense budgets. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 1960, the United Nations has been concerned with identifying 
the links that exist between disarmament and social and economic 
development. This concern has focused especially on developing 
countries (LDCs).1 There has been relatively little attention-at least 
at the intergovernmental level-paid to the possibility of disarma-
ment in LDCs.2 Among the reasons often cited for the lack of en-
thusiasm for disarmament in LDCs is that they (1) spend considera-
bly smaller absolute amounts on defense than industrialized 
countries, and (2) resist cutbacks in military expenditures when in-
dustrialized nations are themselves engaged in arms races or refuse 
to cut defense budgets first.3 In short, disarmament advocates pre-
sume that all countries-whether industrialized or not-would ob-
tain benefits in terms of growth if disArmament took place. How-
ever, developing countries are unwilling to cut back without the 
industrialized countries taking the first step.4 
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Although there is undoubtedly some truth to this line of argu-
ment, here we shall maintain that there may be another, more fun-
damental reason for the apparent unwillingness of governments in 
LDCs to promote disarmament. Some recent empirical work inves-
tigating the effect of defense expenditures on economic growth in-
dicates that a number of LDCs have environments where military 
expenditures tend to promote economic growth. As will be noted 
below, the countries that tend to exhibit positive effects from mili-
tary expenditures are the larger, richer, and more dominant Third 
World countries. Although the debate is still unresolved as to 
whether defense does in fact help or hinder growth, here we sug-
gest that the LDCs that apparently derive a net benefit from de-
fense may be unwilling to disarm. This in tum becomes a major im-
pediment to broad disarmament efforts in Third World nations. 
If, on the other hand, leaders in LDCs believe the other side of 
the debate, i.e., that defense spending and economic growth are 
negatively related, then too they may hesitate to cut military bud-
gets. First, leaders might choose to recognize only the positive ef-
fects stemming from defense expenditures (e.g., education) and ig-
nore the dominant negative effects. Second, if a defense hierarchy 
exists, special interest groups such as retired military officers or 
contractors might find it economically advantageous to maintain 
(or even increase) defense spending levels despite the effect on 
growth. Third, the presence of ~ regional arms race may make a de-
fense cut politically infeasible. 
We shall first examine some of the possible impacts of defense 
on economic growth. We shall then review some of the early stud-
ies in the debate; and then look at some recent papers that have 
broken LDCs into subgroups and that have reexamined the causal-
ity issue. 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 
Common sense tells us that military preparations are an economic 
burden: the larger the part of available resources devoted to the 
military area, the smaller the part available for nondefense items 
such as investment in technology and education-activities that are 
in a wider sense the underpinnings of economic and social devel-
opment.s Since the modern defense establishment is often a large 
consumer of technical and managerial manpower and also of for-
Recent Research on Defense Spending and Growth 3 
eign exchange, one would expect the negative impact of the defense 
burden to be particularly evident in developing countries where 
these types of resources are particularly scarce.6 
One can generally argue that defense expenditures can either 
promote or hinder economic growth. Proponents of the former po-
sition justify them not only on grounds of national security but also 
in purely economic terms. One of the first scholars to measure the 
positive link between military spending and economic growth was 
Emile Benoit? He noted that military spending can contribute by: 
(1) feeding, clothing and housing a number of people who would other-
wise have to be fed, housed and clothed by the civilian economy ... (2) 
providing education and medical care as well as vocational and technical 
training ... (3) engaging in a variety of public works-roads, dams, river 
improvements, airports, communications networks, etc.-that may in 
part serve civilian uses, and (4) engaging in scientific and technical spe-
cialities ... which would otherwise have to be performed by civilian per-
sonnel.8 
In addition, the military is often the first to learn new technological 
developments and often seems the most willing to train its person-
nel in the handling and use of such equipment. And spillover bene-
fits filter into the rest of the economy. 
The basic criticism against defense expenditures is that they 
represent a significant opportunity cost-if the same resources had 
been spent in other sectors of the eco_nomy there would have been a 
significant improvement in the growth rate.9 Benoit recognized 
three possible negative effects: an income shift as increased military 
spending reduces the civilian domestic product, the productivity 
effect since government expenditures exhibit "negligible rates of 
measurable productivity increases," and the investment effect 
where military spending crowds out civilian investment.10 
Chan has summarized several other negative effects.11 There 
may be a "balance of payments effect" if economic growth is pri-
marily export-led. Military expenditures in this case might result in 
a significant movement of resources away from the most dynamic 
sectors of the economy, which are often involved in exports. Fur-
thermore, defense spending is quite often import-intensive-
further worsening the balance of payments effect by using up 
scarce foreign exchange or adding to the high external debt. In ad-
dition, Chan mentions the "technological displacement" effect of 
defense R&D budgets, which consume significant amounts of avail-
able resources. 
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All in all, no predominant or consistent pattern emerges as to 
the effect defense expenditures might have on economic growth. A 
logical and convincing case can be made for defense spending help-
ing or hindering growth in LDCs. This dichotomy is further borne 
out by a review of some of the major empirical studies. 
EARLY EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
A number of scholars have attempted to measure the impact of de-
fense expenditures on economic growth in LDCs.12 Rothschild rank 
correlated growth, exports, and military spending for foqrteen 
OECD countries from 1956 to 1969 and found a negative correla-
tion-increases in defense were accompanied by reductions in ex-
ports and growth.13 In a major study, Benoit used 1950-1965 data 
for forty-four developing countries and estimated a model that in-
cluded investment, foreign aid, and defense as independent varia-
bles. He concluded that "contrary to my opinion, countries with a 
heavy defense burden generally had the most rapid rate of growth, 
and those with the lowest defense burdens tended to show the low-
est growth rates."14 
Dabelko and McCormick grouped countries (personalist, cen-
trist, and polyarchic) to assess the impact of defense expenditures 
on education and public health expenditures.15 They concluded 
that (1) significant opportunity costs existed for education and 
health, (2) that the level of development had little or no impact on 
this cost, and (3) that personalist regimes tended to have the high-
est opportunity costs. 
In 1983, Lim estimated a Harrod-Domar type model and found 
a negative relationship between defense and growth.16 Further-
more, his regression equations were estimated for different regions 
of the world. He found a statistically significant negative relation-
ship between defense and growth for the African and Western 
Hemisphere LDCs but no statistical relationship for the countries in 
Asia and Middle East/southern Europe. Smith and Smith hypothe-
sized a positive relationship through the impact on growth of re-
source mobilization, equipment modernization conducted by the 
military, investment in infrastructure by the military, and the inter-
nal supply response to defense demand for goods and services.17 
Although they found a small direct positive effect of defense on ec-
onomic growth, it was far outweighed by the indirect effect of mili-
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tary expenditure on lowering the savings rate. These results were 
supported by a study by Deger and Smith, 18 who also found that 
any positive effect on growth was more than offset by the lower 
savings rate. 
A negative relationship was also found by Taylor et al., 19 who 
estimated a regression equation relating the output growth rate to 
changes in exports, population, the defense burden, capital inflows, 
and capital stock. The same general conclusion was reached by del 
Pano, who focused on just five South American countries.20 He 
found that if military expenditures were reduced, the resulting re-
duction in demand was more than compensated by spending the 
same resources elsewhere in the economy. The 1984 study by Faini, 
Annez, and Taylor estimated that a 1 percent rise in the military's 
share of gross domestic product would lead to a 23 percent and 18 
percent decline in the shares for investment and agriculture, respec-
tively. 21 
Two recent studies continue to illustrate the differing results 
that scholars obtain in this area. For example, Biswas and Ram de-
veloped an "augmented model" and concluded that "military ex-
penditures neither help nor hurt economic growth in LDCs to any 
significant amount."22 On the other hand, in two 1986 studies,23 
Deger recognized that military spending can and does have eco-
nomic benefits: effective demand, stability, interindustrial linkages, 
and major spinoffs. However, on bal.ance she believes the negative 
effects are strongest and that defense spending significantly de-
presses growth and constrains development. She noted that "the 
empirical evidence goes against the findings of Benoit and others 
regarding the positive effects of defense and growth .... defense ex-
penditure allocates scarce resources away from productive civilian 
investment and fails to mobilize or create any additional savings."24 
ALTERNATIVE EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Whereas some of the empirical studies described above have found 
a positive relationship between defense and growth (most notably 
Benoit), others have found no relationship (Biswas and Ram) and 
others have discovered a strong negative relationship (Deger). 
These studies were for the most part prompted by the seminal 
work of Benoit. There are many reasons for the rather mixed results 
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that have been obtained-different country samples, different 
model specifications, different time periods, different definitions of 
what an LDC is, and so on. Two specific areas have received close 
attention in recent years: namely, the splitting of LDCs into sub-
groups, and the issue of causality. 
Empirical Testing Using Subgroups 
By and large, the empirical studies attempting to uncover the rela-
tionship between military expenditures and economic growth in 
LDCs "lump" all LDCs into one sample. By doing so, researchers 
implicitly assume a basic homogeneity in Third World environ-
ments-that, for example, the impact of military expenditures is the 
same in Saudi Arabia as it is in Bangladesh. It further assumes that 
the composition of military expenditure is similar across all coun-
tries. The cross-section analyses do not allow for differing impacts 
on growth from countries who spend a disproportionate amount 
on military education or sophisticated arms imports. Similarly, it is 
possible to argue that the impact of defense on growth will be dif-
ferent in those countries that have a well-established arms industry 
than in a country with no military-industrial complex. Further-
more, it can be hypothesized that the impact might be different ac-
cording to the regime-civilial'). or military-given that budget pri-
orities for both sets of regimes are likely to be quite dissimilar. 
The early attempts to split the total sample into subgroups (de-
scribed above) were by government (Dabelko and McCormick), by 
hemisphere (Lim), and by region (Taylor et al., del Pano). One of 
the possible reasons for the mixed results in the debate is because 
the resulting groups contained countries with extremely diverse en-
vironments. In our opinion, it is likely that had one or two coun-
tries been included or excluded the final result might have been 
quite different. 
To overcome this problem, Frederiksen and Looney grouped 
countries according to resource constraints.25 They hypothesized 
that a severely resource-constrained country facing a budget reduc-
tion is likely to sacrifice development projects to maintain defense 
budgets. The impetus for such a policy might be political expe-
diency, or that special interest groups might find it more advanta-
geous to maintain the status quo. In countries that have a relative 
abundance of resources, the reverse is true: these countries can af-
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ford high-growth development projects concomitant with main-
taining or even increasing defense programs. Using Benoit's model 
and sample, they found a positive relationship between defense 
and growth in the resource-abundant countries and a negative rela-
tionship in the resource-constrained countries. 
Using Urn's model specification, they tested the relationship 
for a later period and larger set of countries but grouped according 
to national savings and balance of payments (both as a percentage 
of gross domestic investment).26 The coefficient of the defense vari-
able was positive (and statistically significant) in the richer group 
but statistically insignificant in the poorer group. A similar result 
was obtained after grouping countries based on access to foreign 
resources-exports, external borrowing, and the like. 27 
By and large, this research demonstrates a pattern whereby 
certain groups of Third World countries-usually the most impor-
tant countries from an economic, political, or arms production 
point of view28-derive positive impacts from military spending. 
Those countries that are less successful economically or that lack a 
domestic arms industry fail to derive any positive impacts from de-
fense and often experience negative economic growth. 
The Direction of Causality 
Another aspect of the debate that has recently received close scru-
tiny has been the causality issue. In his original work, Benoit noted 
that "the direct interaction between growth and defense burdens 
seems to run primarily from defense burdens to growth rather than 
vice versa. It seems clear than in the sample countries higher de-
fense burdens stimulate growth."29 The assumption that defense is 
the independent variable in any regression equation has recently 
been challenged by Joerding.30 Using Granger causality methods, 
he tested for the assumed exogeneity of defense budgets. Using one 
sample of fifteen observations from each of fifty-seven different 
countries, he concluded that defense expenditures are not strongly 
exogenous and that previous studies were thus flawed. 
Although noting that Joerding's paper was important, Frede-
riksen and LaCivita made two major criticisms: all countries are 
lumped together, and the time lag structure was the same for all 
countries.31 While Chan noted that the search for a universal pat-
tern applicable to all countries is likely to be disappointing,32 Fred-
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eriksen and LaCivita found that for the Philippines causality runs 
from economic growth to defense. In another study that examined 
twenty-one countries, they found that the relationship between 
growth and defense differs among countries.33 In four countries ec-
onomic growth preceded defense, and in three countries defense 
preceded growth. There was no discernible relationship for four 
countries and there was feedback in the remaining ten countries. In 
addition, the lag structure was found to vary widely among coun-
tries. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Recent empirical work on the impact of military expenditures on 
Third World economies, while not directly dealing with the issue of 
disarmament, nevertheless provides some insights as to why devel-
oping countries are perhaps reluctant to reduce defense budgets. 
The initial post-Benoit studies, which for the most part grouped all 
LDCs together, tended to find a negative relationship between de-
fense spending and growth, that is, increases in military spending 
were associated with decreases in economic growth. Some of these 
early studies also attempted to group countries and reestimate the 
model for each subgroup. We have suggested that the resulting 
groups often contained countries with widely differing economic 
environments. , 
Later studies focused on (1) splitting the LDCs into more ho-
mogeneous groups using resource constraints, and (2) testing for 
causality and appropriate lag structure. Regardless of the division 
chosen, usually the same set of countries tended to experience posi-
tive impacts from defense expenditures. These countries were the 
larger, more economically successful, and thus more influential 
Third World states. These included Mexico, Brazil, South Korea, 
Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Algeria, Venezuela, Turkey, 
Spain, Egypt, Indonesia, Nigeria, India, Thailand, and Jordan. The 
empirical evidence casts at least some doubt as to whether disarma-
ment might be in the best economic interests of these countries. 
Although it is doubtful that we will ever know whether de-
fense "causes" growth or whether growth "allows" 9,efense, there 
are several interpretations stemrniqg from the above studies. First, 
there may be an unwillingness on the part of some Third World 
countries to disarm because their leaders believe in a "Benoit ef-
fect": that the positive economic benefits from defense expenditures 
Recent Research on Defense Spending and Growth 9 
outweigh the negative effects. 
Another interpretation is that if the preponderance of the evi-
dence suggests a negative impact of defense, leaders in Third 
World (and other) countries may choose to ignore the evidence; in-
stead they might prefer to emphasize or to only "understand" the 
visible positive effects of military spending. Often, for political rea-
sons or because a defense hierarchy exists, these leaders choose to 
yield to the pressure groups that will derive future benefits from 
military spending at the current or increased levels. In other words, 
leaders in LDCs tend to overlook the sometimes indirect and hid-
den costs for the whole economy and to concentrate only on the 
positive aspects of military spending. 
While well-intended, proposals for disarmament would seem 
to face a number of well-known political and nationalistic obstacles. 
Even if these obstacles were to be overcome, proposals to disarm 
might be challenged on purely economic grounds. A significant 
number of developing countries could conceivably experience de-
clines in economic growth rates if military budgets were to be cut. 
Added to the more traditional obstacles to disarmament, the eco-
nomic argument is likely to make the United Nations' efforts to-
ward disarmament even more difficult. 
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